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Chapter 1
Chapter 9: Bio/Nature-Inspired algorithms in
A.I. for malicious activity detection
Andria Procopiou 1 and Nikos Komninos 1
1.1 Introduction
Malicious software [1] is one of the main threats to networks and its assets, as well
as individual users. As we approach the Internet of Things and Cyber-Physical Sys-
tems era, network traffic becomes more complex and heterogeneous. In recent years,
the number of devices connected to the Internet is increased exponentially as well as
big data that is produced from them. Also, each device comes with its own protocols
and standards. Furthermore, computing devices operate with different protocols and
standards and effective traffic monitoring becomes harder. Hence, adversaries con-
duct more sophisticated attacks against networks so the malicious behaviour can be
more difficult to be detected. Simplistic and one-dimensional security countermea-
sures are likely to fail under such circumstances.
Artificial intelligence and particularly learning algorithms seems to be appropri-
ate for detecting cyber attacks. Using machine learning, fast and accurate detection
of malicious behaviour is more achievable than ever. A special branch of machine
learning algorithms includes nature and bio inspired algorithms. Such algorithms
followed models from nature, biology, social systems and life sciences. Some ex-
amples include genetic algorithms, swarm intelligence, artificial immune systems,
evolutionary algorithms, artificial neural networks, fractal geometry, chaos theory
and so on [2].
Nature/Bio-inspired algorithms have an advantage against traditional machine
learning algorithms, they focus on optimisation. In detail, nature acts as a method of
making something as perfect as possible or choosing the most fitted samples from a
population. In practice, this family of algorithms applies these principles in the form
of optimisation and finding the best solution to the problem assigned. In anomaly de-
tection, the main objective is to identify the malicious behaviour so these algorithms
use their best-fit mechanisms to detect malicious abnormalities. Another beneficial
usage of nature/bio inspired algorithms is to optimise the potential features used in
attacks detection. An optimal set of features is selected for efficient malware detec-
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Figure 1.1 Bio/Nature-Inspred Algorithms Taxonomy
tion but also for reducing the complexity and computational burden. Additionally,
nature/bio-inspired algorithms are highly flexible as they can accept a mixture of
variables in terms of type and continuity. This gives us the opportunity to give a
variety of different variable types which expand feature selection in such algorithms.
In this chapter, we will explore how nature/bio-inspired algorithms are applied
in intrusion detection against different threats and attacks for various networks. The
first section of this chapter gives an introduction and in-depth explanation of how the
most popular nature/bio-inspired algorithms operate. Both the theoretical and prac-
tical concepts are explained and how these algorithms operate to detect malicious
behaviour in the context of cyber security. The second section includes a selection
of the most notable and complete studies of anomaly detection using nature/bio-
inspired algorithms in networks and in low-resources systems such as cyber-physical
systems and IoT. In the third section the techniques used and the results produced are
discussed. Finally, future directions on how nature-inspired algorithms could be ap-
plied in detecting anomalies in such systems is presented.
1.2 Towards Technology through Nature
It can safely be stated that nature is the most suitable entity of solving hard and com-
plex problems. It is able to find the most suitable solution. It can also maintain the
balance between various components. Hence, computer scientists have been inspired
by it, and created their own algorithms based on natural phenomena and procedures.
Bio/Nature-inspired algorithms simulate the nature at solving optimisation problems.
In the next section, we group and explain the most popular bio/nature-inspired algo-
rithms as categorised in Figure 1.1.
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1.2.1 Terminologies of Bio/Nature-inspired Algorithms
1.2.1.1 Populations
The term population is an important and vital concept in the field of bio/nature-
inspired algorithms. In biology and nature sciences, the term population defines a
group of either animals or people that belong to a specific kind/type and live in a
specific place [3] . In bio/nature-inspired algorithms, the term population refers to
a set of possible solutions to a specific problem. In every bio/nature-inspired algo-
rithm the procedure starts with an initial population. An initial population is the first
commencing set of solutions or candidates, before the algorithm starts functioning,
with a specific size. Depending on the type of algorithm used, the population size
can change.
The members of a population can be cooperative or competitive. In algorithms
that consist of population members that are cooperative, no new members will be
either added or deleted. On the other hand, in algorithms where the members of a
population are competitive only the fittest members will be included. This process is
iterative and on each iteration (called generation) the fitness of the current members
is compared to the new members generated. The weakest already existing members
are replaced with the strongest new members. Some old and new member genera-
tions are combined to create the most optimal solution based on rules. New members
that can be potentially merged with the population must be evaluated through scor-
ing. The score value is calculated based on the suitability of each member’s solution
[3].
. Also, add .(page 213, paragraph 2)
1.2.1.2 Selection
The process of selection involves choosing one or more potential solutions to the
problem from the population. Depending on the bio/nature-inspired algorithm cho-
sen, a different selection procedure is adopted [3].
1.2.1.3 Crossover
In biology, crossover is the process which a male and a female mate together to
breed offspring. In bio/nature-inspired algorithms crossover does not consider gen-
ders, any two candidates can mate to produce children. Crossover is mostly used in
Evolutionary Algorithms [3].
1.2.1.4 Mutation
In biology, a mutation is a change in an organism’s DNA sequence. This change can
be either benign or malignant. In bio/nature-inspired algorithms ”mutation” denotes
the asexual reproduction, so a child could be created from a single parent. Mutation
is mostly used in Evolutionary Algorithms. Through mutation, potential solutions
can breed a child (new solution, that is potentially slightly better) in the next gener-
ation. If a solution has become optimal through mutation, it can become even more
efficient [3].
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1.2.2 Review of Bio/Nature-Inspired Algorithms
1.2.2.1 Artificial Neural Networks
Artificial Neural Networks have been inspired by the biological neural networks
present in animal brains and was firstly introduced in 1943 by [4]. ANN models
are inspired from biological neural networks that process an acceptable information.
Just as animal brains contain biological neurons, ALRFC contain a set of intercon-
nected nodes, called artificial neurons. Each connection between the different arti-
ficial neural networks (analogous to synapses in animal brains) helps the model of
interconnected neurons (nodes) that communicate with each other by exchanging in-
formation. The neurons are connected with a set of adaptive weights that are tuned
by a learning algorithm that accepts a great set of inputs and decides how the weights
between the nodes are going to be adapted.
ALRFC are ideal for pattern recognition. In this simplest form, there are three
types of layers in ALRFC; the input layer that accepts the pattern data; the hidden
layer that applies the algorithm for deciding what the result should be; and the out-
put layer that shows the result. Most of the models have at least an input and and
output layer. The input layer accepts the pattern and the output layer gives the output
pattern. The hidden layer defines the interaction between the input and the output
layers. A diagram of a typical ANN architecture is shown in Figure 1.2.
ALRFC can be either supervised or unsupervised. Both of these processes are
iterative. In supervised training, the similarity between the actual and the supposed
output is calculated at each iteration. This is described in the form of a percentage
error. The calculation of the error is called Backpropagation. At each iteration the in-
ternal weights matrices are altered towards minimising this error at a low acceptable
percentage.
In unsupervised training, calculating this error percentage is not straightforward
due to the model not having an expected output. Hence, the model cannot estimate
the current output is from the ideal output. Instead, the model is iterated for a fixed
number of rounds..
There are different types of ALRFC. Al of them have common elements such
as neurons, weights, activation functions and layers. However, each type fits for
Table 1.1 ANN Architectures
Clustering Regression Classification Prediction
Self-Org. Map(1) Feed Forward (1) Feedforward (1) Recurrent (1)
- Deep Feed-forward (1) Deep Belief Network (1) Deep Feedforward (2)
- Reccurent (2) Deep Feedforward (1) Feedforward (2)
- Convolutional (3) Convolutional (1) -
- - Recurrent (2) -
- - - -
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Figure 1.2 Artificial Neural Network Architecture
different tasks. Due to their versatile nature, not all of the types of ALRFC can
perform equally well in every problem. There are various problems ALRFC in gen-
eral can solve though, including clustering, regression, classification and prediction
problems. In Table 1.1 we present a table with the most popular ANN types and
the problems they can solve best, inspired by [3]. The problem is at the top and in
descending order the architecture that solves it best.
ALRFC have been used extensively in Intrusion and Malware Detection. The
relevant features to differentiate between normal and malicious activity are extracted
from the raw data collected and fed to the input neurons of the ANN architecture.
The extracted data are processed in the hidden layers of neurons and the final result
is output through the output neurons.
1.2.2.2 Evolutionary Algorithms
Evolutionary Algorithms (EA) is a branch of nature/bio-inspired algorithms in Artifi-
cial Intelligence that is very popular and considered classical from all the nature/bio-
inspired techniques [5]. EAs comprise of evolutionary techniques and mechanisms
taken from the biological evolutions. Some examples include reproduction, mu-
tation, selection and recombination. Since these biological models are considered
nearly perfect when finding the most fitted individuals, their artificial equivalents are
designed to find solutions to hard problems.
The procedure followed in different types of EAs is similar to the equivalent in
nature. There is an initial population of random candidates in which natural selection
occurs, otherwise called survival of the fittest. Each individual candidate is evaluated
through a fitness/quality function. Then iteratively: The best candidates are chosen
as parents to seed the next generation of candidates (reproduction). This is done by
crossover and/or mutation applied to them. The generated candidates (offspring) are
generated are evaluated by the fitness/quality function and replace the least fitting
candidates of the previous generation. This process can be iterative until a sufficient
solution (set of candidates) is constructed or a computational limit is met.
During this process, the fitness of candidates in consecutive populations is im-
proved and the easiness of adaption to new environments is also improved. Below
we briefly enlist and explain the most notable EAs and summarise the GA’s flow in
Figure 1.3.
1) Genetic Algorithm
Genetic Algorithm (GA) was firstly introduced by Holland in 1975 [6]. It is a
very popular evolutionary-based algorithm especially for optimisation purposes. The
algorithm functions as follows:
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Figure 1.3 GA Algorithm
Step 1: It begins by initialising a population of solutions (chromosomes).
Step 2: Applying a fitness function, the current chromosomes are evaluated.
Step 3: The best chromosomes are selected to generate a new generation of
chromosomes through crossover and mutation.
Step 4: The new chromosomes are evaluated and exchanged with the least fit of
the previous generation of chromosomes.
In Intrusion Detection, certain procedures have to be made before the training.
The different groups of data (two at least with normal and attack) represent the ini-
tial different groups of chromosomes. Then the training starts with the procedure
described above. During the testing/detection part, the input data is taken and an
initial population’s created from it. The generated population is compared to the
training population. The chromosomes that the new population’s chromosomes are
related the closest are classified after them.
2) Genetic Programming
Genetic Programming (GP) was firstly proposed by Koza in 1992[7] and it is
considered an extension of the Genetic Algorithm. GP represents the solution in the
form of a tree and computer programmes are generated (instead of chromosomes).
GP functions as follows:
Step 1: An initial population of computer software programmes is generated,
which consists of functions and terminals.
Step 2: Each computer programme solves a problem given and a fitness value is
assigned based on its accuracy.
Step 3: Once again, the best programmes are chosen to breed the next genera-
tion.
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Step 4: Through mutation and crossover new computer programmes are created
to form the next generation.
Step 5: Finally, the best programmes of the new generation are exchanged with
the worst ones of the previous generation.
3) Evolutionary Strategy
Evolutionary Strategy (ES) methods were proposed by Bienert, Rechenberg and
Schwefel in 1964 [8]. It is an optimisation algorithm which is based on the adaption
of evolution theory. A special characteristic of the ES is that the mutation can be
controlled depending on the type of the ES strategy chosen. Hence, both the search
process and the solution are optimised, as well as the mutation parameters. Below,
the most popular schemes are briefly explained [9].
(1+1) -ES : This is the scheme with the simplest selection mechanism. A real-
valued vector of variables is created from the parent through mutation, by using
standard deviation to each variable object. Then, newly constructed individual is
evaluated and compared to its parent. The best of the two becomes the new parent
for the next generation with the less fit being discarded.
(µ + λ )-ES: In this scheme, an µ number of parents is chosen from the current
generation. These µ parents are responsible for creating the λ offspirng through
mutation and crossover. Then the µ generation and λ offpsirng are united into one
group, with only the best mi remaining, and the rest being discarded.
(µ , λ )-ES: Once again, µ parents are chosen from the current generation to
generate the λ offspring (where λ ≥ µ). From the new generation only the best µ
offspring individuals survive, with the parents being discarded completely.
Evolutionary Strategies are particularly effective against Intrusion Detection be-
cause they generate rules that can match the malicious traffic. To evaluate the pop-
ulation of suggested solutions, the dataset chosen is used to judge at which iteration
the most optimal solution is obtained.
Evolutionary Programming Evolutionary Programming (EP) is again an ex-
tension of the ES methods, also using the theory of evolution [10]. It is very similar
to the genetic programming method as it encompasses of computer programmes as
well. Their major difference is that the structure of the programme to be optimised
is fixed.
1.2.2.3 Swarm Intelligence Algorithms
Swarm Intelligence (SI) has been introduced by Beni and Wang [11] in 1989 for
cellular robotic systems. The concept consists of collaborative functioning by a large
number of small organisms such as bees, ants, birds and so on. Based on this concept
self-organising computer network systems can operate efficiently. Under this term,
the most common technique used is the Ant Colony Optimisation, which are based
on the oragnisation of large ant colonies for food transporting reasons, Artificial
Bee Colonies, Fish Swarm Algorithm, Intelligent Water Drops Algorithm, Firefly
algorithms and so on. Below we briefly describe the common fundamental concepts
all of the Swarm Intelligence are based on. A summary of how SI algorithms operate
is illustrated in Figure 1.4.
Swarm Intelligence Fundamentals
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Figure 1.4 SI Algorithm
Proximity Fundamental: The population performs a series of time and space
computation calculations to function properly.
Quality Fundamental: In the presence of environment quality factors, the pop-
ulation shall be able to positively react.
Diverse Response Methods: In any procedures the population carries out, the
means and ways shall not be limited and fixed.
Stability Fundamental: The population shall be able to remain intact and fixed
in its functioning, regardless of any changes in the environment.
Adaptability Fundamental: The population must be ”intelligent” enough to re-
alise that if the computational burden can be decreased, then it shall change its be-
haviour.
SI algorithms can be applied in intrusion detection by constructing a set of rules
for effective classification. Each organism creates a set of rules that evaluates them
with the training set it is provided with. With iterations, the rules are reconstructed
and extended enough to have a high accuracy percentage.
Particle Swarm Optimisation
Particle Swarm Optimisation (PSO) was firstly introduced by Kennedy and Eber-
hart in 1995 [12] and has been inspired by the food searching activity of birds. It is
an optimisation type of algorithm and has been extensively used due to its simplicity,
computational lightness and straightforward implementation. In detail, the ”particle”
word of the name means the population members which are low in mass and volume
can achieve a better behaviour. Every ”particle” in the population can be considered
a solution. Each solution consists of four vectors in the high dimensional space: cur-
rent position, best position discovered yet, best position discovered yet by neighbour
and velocity. Each particle rearranges its position in the search space based on two
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factors, its best position and its neighbour’s best position during the search process
until a stopping criteria is met.
Ant Colony Optimisation
Ant Colony Optimisation (ACO) was firstly introduced by Dorigo and Di Caro
in 1999 [13]. It was inspired by the remarkable ability of ant species to collabo-
ratively find the shortest path between their nest and the various food sources by
making usage of pheromone trails. The more pheromone each path has, the stronger
the probability is to follow it. This procedure is a type of reinforcement.
Artificial Bee Colony Algorithm
Artificial Bee Colony Algorithm (ABC) was proposed by Karaboga in 2005
[14].Inspired by the behaviour of bees, several swarm intelligence algorithms have
been proposed. Mainly, there are two types, foraging and mating. One of the most
popular foraging algorithms is the ABC algorithm which simulates the behavior of
honeybees groups. This promotes intelligent and cooperative behavior between bees
with different roles. A bee can have one of the two following behaviors; the first
is when a bee finds food, the other bees are lead to the food source and the second
is when bees leaving food sources for others. The bee can have three roles in these
scenarios, the employed bee, the onlooker bee and the scout bee. In the ABC algo-
rithm the place where the food is located can be a potential solution to the problem
and the quality of the food maps to the fitness of the solution. The number of on-
looker or employed bees corresponds to the number of the solutions to the problem.
Concluding, there is only one employed bee for every food source.
Fish Swarm Algorithm
The Fish Swarm Algorithm (FSA) is a relatively new population-based/swarm
algorithm, proposed in 2002 by Li et al. [15]. The FSA was based on fish schooling
behaviour to search for food. A fish in the FSA algorithm is represented by a D-
dimensional position and the fish food satisfaction is represented by a numerical
metric. The relationship between the two fish is denoted by the euclidean distance of
the two. Three basic behaviours are consisted in this algorithm, ”searching for food”,
”swarming against to a threat” and ”following towards a better result ”. Searching
for food means that the fish randomly search for food so they can minimise the food
satisfaction. Swarming means that the objective is to keep the food levels of fish
satisfactory, keep the existing fish happy and attract new fish. Following means that
when a fish locates food, the others will follow.
Firefly Algorithm
The Firefly Algorithm (FA) has firstly been introduced by Yang [16] in 2009 and
has been inspired by the flashing behaviour of the fireflies. The algorithm consists
of an iterative procedure with a population of agents (the fireflies) working together
to solve an optimisation problem. The algorithm is based on the following concept
of finding a solution: a better firefly glows more. Each firefly attracts other fireflies,
regardless of their gender, so the searching for the optimal solution in the search
space can be found more efficiently. The procedure is the following:
Step 1: All the fireflies will move towards the brightest one, regardless of their
gender.
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Figure 1.5 AIS Algorithm
Step 2: The more a firefly glows, the more attractive it is towards the others.
The brightness can be decreased though due to distance. If there is not a firefly that
stands out in terms of brightness from the rest, then they will move randomly.
Step 3: The brightness of a firefly is based on the result of a calculation of the
objective function for a given problem.
1.2.2.4 Artificial Immune Systems
Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) Algorithm has been firstly introduced in 1999 [17]
by Dasgupta and was inspired by the human immune system. The human immune
system is a true wonder, as it is highly evolving, works in a parallel and distributive
way, it is robust and can be adapted easily to any environment. The human body
generates various detector cells (antibodies) to guard against non-self cells (anti-
gens/pathogens). Antibodies are distributed to the entire body so there is no central
coordinator. Each antigen is unique and independent in terms of detection. Hence,
the set of body cells is mapped to the system/network/hosts to be protected and the
antibodies are the IDS agents to detect the external entities (pathogens).
There are various algorithms to create antibodies to protect cells from pathogens,
such the clonal selection algorithm (CSA) and the negative selection algorithm (NSA).
The CSA is based on the concept of acquired immunity where in a specific way
B and T lymphocytes respond in a better way to antigens over time. The negative
selection algorithm is inspired by the biological concept of identifying and deleting
self-reacting cells that attack self-tissues.
NSA operates as follows: normal data are defined as self-patterns. Then, a great
number of random patterns is generated and compared to the self-patterns. If the
new generated pattern matches one of the self-pattern, then it becomes a detector
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otherwise it is discarded. Next in the monitoring state, if there is a match between
a detector and an incoming traffic part, then an anomaly is present. Neighborhood
Negative Selection (LRFC) on the other hand operates in two stages. In the first
stage, feature extraction takes place and then these features are used to train the
algorithm. The system extracts the duration/direction of the flow and the number
of packets/bytes. In the second stage, the LRFC algorithm is used for detection.
A quantitative approach is adopted to detect instead of a single threshold. A less
used algorithm of AIS is the Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA). DCA is based on how
dendritic cells operate in natural immune systems as activators.
AIS relies on mutation to make its decisions and operates in the following way:
Step 1: Initialisation: The potential solutions to the problem (antibodies) are
initialised. Antigens mark the value of the objective function that must be optimised.
Step 2: Cloning: The antibodies are evaluated on how fit they are. The best
antibodies are cloned proportionally, with the best being cloned the most.
Step 3: Hypermutation: In this stage, the best antibody’s clones are mostly
mutated and the worst antibody’s clones are lessly mutated. Next, the clones are
evaluated with their original antibodies. The best antibodies are kept for the next
generation, with the best being discarded, for the next generation. This mutation can
be gaussian, exponential or uniform.
In Intrusion Detection , AIS consists of three phases. Firstly, the algorithm de-
fines itself by learning the normal behaviour so it can construct a baseline. Secondly,
it generates detectors thrgh he T-cells prcess. Thirdly, the input data are compared to
all the T-detectors. If there is a match then there is no intrusion.
1.2.2.5 Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy Logic (FL) was proposed in 1965 [18] by Zadeh. FL concept mimics the
human brain interpretation of uncertain information. Similar to the brain operation,
FL replies to inputs with approximate (truthy/faulty) rather than distinct and exact
reasoning. In reasoning some questions have various answers, based on a set of
knowledge and rules that form a specific solution to the problem. Likewise, each FL
reply has a degree of truth and in combination with probabilities they form a fuzzy
set.
1.2.2.6 Chaos Theory
Chaos is a sub-area of mathematics that was firstly formed by Edward Lorenz in 1972
[19]. In contrast to most of the scientific models that are responsible for modelling
predictive behaviour such as gravity, electricity, chemical reactions and so on, Chaos
Theory can model non-linear behaviour that has no means of being predicted such
as the weather, stock market and so on. Formally, in the context of complex systems
there are always subtle patterns, iterative feedbacks along with iteration itself, un-
derlying similarities in behaviour and overall connections between the various states
of a system. A very important aspect in chaos theory is that in a complex system
there is the so called ”sensitive dependence on initial conditions”, the ”butterfly ef-
fect”. In detail, this effect denotes that a small change in a single state of a complex
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deterministic non-linear system can cause major changes in a later state/outcome of
it.
In the context of Intrusion Detection, the IDS system closely monitors the traffic
and through calculations can understand at what extend it starts behaving chaotically.
If there is an indication of chaos, then there is likely an intrusion.
1.2.2.7 Game Theory
Game Theory (GT) has been applied in many areas including mathematics, psychol-
ogy, economics, computer science, political sciences, and gambling. GT is inspired
from mathematical modeling and decision-making. Although multiple and different
approaches to Game Theory have been proposed it has been firstly introduced by
Neumann in 1928 [20]. It studies cooperation and conflict between individuals who
make decisions upon particular rule-scenarios. The theory consists of games played
between players where games can be cooperative or non-cooperative depending on
the players intentions. Games are also based on self-interest or common interest.
In the context of Intrusion Detection, a game is played between the IDS and the
possible attacker. Based on the model constructed and the assumptions considered,
a decision is made on whether there is an intrusion.
1.3 Cyber Attacks and Malware Detection
In cyber space there are numerous cyber attacks that can be conducted against net-
works and/or individual assets. These attacks can threaten one or more of the main
Cyber Security Principles : Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. Below we
give a brief explanation of the most popular cyber attacks & malware and their im-
pact on a network and/or asset, as well as which Cyber Security Principle they mostly
negatively affect.
1.3.1 Distributed / Denial of Service Attacks
A Distributed / Denial of Service Attacks (D)DoS attack can be volumetric or vul-
nerability exploitation-based or reflection-based. A volumetric DoS attack consists
of an attacker sending a massive volume of requests in an attempt to flood the target
machine and make it unable to accept legitimate requests from normal users [21]. In
a vulnerability-exploitation (D)DoS attack an attacker is taking advantage of a sys-
tem or protocol or communication weakness to make the target machine unavailable
to legitimate requests from normal users. In a reflection (D)DoS attack the target is
responding with the received challenge. A (D)DoS attack can also occur in any of the
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) Layers. (D)DoS attacks
mainly threat the Availability Security Principle.
(D)DoS attacks can occur in all the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) layers.
Below we briefly describe the most popular (D)DoS attacks across all layers.
Physical Layer:In the Physical Layer we have Jamming attacks.
A Jamming attack consists of an adversary flooding the physical medium with
signals in order for legitimate packets not being able to be transmitted normally.
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A Jamming attack has multiple forms. The most popular is the Constant Jamming
(D)DoS attack where a burst amount of radio signals are constantly sent. The sec-
ond type is the Deceptive Jamming (D)DoS which falsely sends radio signals in an
attempt to make the target unavailable.
Link (MAC) Layer:
In the Media Access Control (MAC) layer we have the ARP Poisoning attack
where the attacker performs MAC address spoofing so it can send Address Resolu-
tion Protocol (ARP) Messages to a network. Hence, messages are redirected to him
instead of the normal user. Therefore, the attacker can cause a (D)DoS attack by
dropping the packets.
In wireless networks, a node that wants to connect to a wireless network, scans
the environment to connect to an available network by sending Probe Requests. The
access point responds back, providing information about the network. In a Probe
Request Flooding attack, the adversary sends a burst amount of probe requests to
the access point to make it unavailable to legitimate requests.
Another popular attack in the MAC layer consists of the Authentication Request
Flood.The attacker who has already perfromed a MAC spoofing attack to try and
authenticate themsevles to the access point by sending authentication requests. The
attacker aims to flood the access point with authentication requests.
Network/Transport Layer: In the network and transport layer we have a vari-
ety of different types of (D)DoS attacks.
In a SYN-Flood (TCP-Flood) (D)DoS the attacker sends a great number of SYN
packets to the target until the target becomes unresponsive to legitimate requests. In
a normal situation a clients initiates a TCP connection by sending a SYN message to
the server. The server responds with a SYN-ACK to the client, the client responds
back with an ACK message and the connection is established (three-way handshake).
In a UDP Flooding (D)DoS the attacker sends a large number of User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) packets to random ports of the target.
In a Gray Hole (D)DoS the attacker selectively drops packets that are to reach a
particular destination.
A Black Hole (D)DoS is similar to the gray-hole attack but the attacker drops all
packets passed by it.
An ICMP Flooding (D)DoS , otherwise called Ping Flooding (D)DoS attack,
sends a burst amount of Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo request
packets to the server.
In a Low-Rate (D)DoS the attacker exploits TCPs retransmission timeout mech-
anism and sends low-rate traffic to the target so the connection can be kept alive. As
time goes by, the attacker opens more and more connections and eventually makes
the target unavailable to legitimate incoming connections.
In a Ping of Death (PoD) (D)DoS the attacker aims to make the target unavail-
able by sending either malformed or oversized packets using the ping command.
In a Teardrop (D)DoS the attacker sends mingled IP fragments with either over-
lapping or over-sized payloads to the target server in an attempt to make it unavail-
able.
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In a Land (D)DoS the attacker sends a TCP packet, which contains the targets
IP Address as both the source and the destination. This causes the victim to send
replies to itself over and over again, resulting into it becoming unavailable.
The Fraggle (D)DoS is similar to Smurf attack but instead of ICMP echo pack-
ets the attacker sends UDP echo packets to the target.
The Smurf (D)DoS attack can either be a simple or distributed DoS attack where
the attacker(s) through IP Spoofing the victims IP address sends a large number of
ICMP echo requests to the IP broadcast address. As a result, the victims computer
is becoming extremely slow and eventually becoming unavailable. Finally in the
application layer we have a fair number of different (D)DoS attacks.
The SIP Flooding (D)DoS attack is conducted in the Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP), which is an application layer protocol used in Internet telephony for both voice
and video calls as well as instant messaging. The attack floods the target with either
valid or invalid calls or messages.
In an HTTP Flooding (D)DoS the attacker sends a burst amount of legitimate
get or post request to the victim resulting into the target becoming unavailable to
legitimate requests in the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). Since the requests
are perfectly legitimate the server has no ways of rejecting them.
In a DNS (D)DoS the attacker sends Domain Name System (DNS) queries that
at first are small in size but then become large in size. The attacker redirects these
messages to the victims IP address resulting into a targets unavailable state.
In a Slow Rate (Request and Post requests and Response) (D)DoS the attacker
takes advantage of the servers waiting time for a get/post request to be completed
(time-out time). The server is waiting for a specific amount of time for the client to
send the request before closing the connection. The attacker instead sends a request
very slowly, tricking the server into believing that simply the request is coming from
a slow connection. In time, the attacker opens more and more connections to send
requests that are never completed. As a result, the server becomes unavailable. In
response attacks the attacker reads the response sent to him very slowly by having a
much smaller window-size than the servers send buffer size.
In SSL (D)DoS attacks the adversary exploits the Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
hanshake authnetication mechanism. In detail, the attacker sends bogus data to the
target or exploits the functions to the SSL encryption key negotiation procedure.
1.3.2 Botnets
A botnet is a set of devices/machines that are connected to the Internet which, at
some point, have been infected by a malware and are controlled by an adversary, the
botmaster. A botnet can perform a (D)DoS attack, send spam mail or engage in click
frauds [22]. This can result into the network/target not functioning fully thus, the
Availability principle is threatened.
1.3.3 Malware
Malware, an acronym for Malicious Software is a general term encompassing any
malicious or intrusive programme. It can take the form of a an executable code,
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script, active content and so on. A malware exploits any known or unknown vulner-
abilities of a system, network, machine, protocol and so on so it can illegally execute
malicious code to steal data, destroy assets or abuse services and/or functions [22].
The most popular types of malware are briefly explained below.
1.3.3.1 Viruses
A virus is a malicious software that once installed, through user interaction, it starts
making copies of itself and infects various types of files and/or programmes. Through
it the Confidentiality and Integrity principles are affected [22].
1.3.3.2 (Remote Access)Trojan Horses
A Trojan Horse is a type of malware that masquerades itself as a legitimate, useful
programme in order for the victim to be tricked and install it. It has taken its name
from the Ancient Greek Trojan Horse used to stealthily invade the city of Troy. In
contrast to viruses and worms, Trojans do not usually inject or propagate themselves
in other files. A Remote Access Trojan is a special type of Trojan that gives to the
adversary remote access to the victim’s computer. Through it the Confidentiality and
Integrity principles are affected [22].
1.3.3.3 Rootkits
A rootkit is a special type of malware that its main strength is that it remains un-
detected. To achieve that, it modifies the victim’s operating system so it remains
hidden from the user. In detail, the rootkit is able to hide malicious processed from
being visible in the list of active processes. It also eliminates any access to its files.
Through it the Confidentiality and Integrity principles are affected [22].
1.3.3.4 Backdoors
A backdoor gives the ability to the adversary to invisibly access and manipulate
remotely a machine by bypassing any form of authentication. Through it the Confi-
dentiality and Integrity principles are affected [22].
1.3.3.5 Spyware
A spyware is a malicious software that once installed on a victim’s comptuer, starts
illegally gathering information about assets without the user’s consent. Through it
the Confidentiality and Integrity principles are affected [22].
1.3.3.6 Worms
A worm is a type of malware that, unlike viruses, can replicate itself without any user
interaction and spread to other computer when connected to a network. Through it
the Confidentiality and Integrity principles are affected [22].
1.3.3.7 Ransomware
A ransomware is a special type of malware that either aims to encrypt a victim’s
entire data and/or programmes or block access to the entire machine. To reverse
these malicious actions, a ransom must be paid to the adversary [22].Through it the
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Confidentiality and Integrity principles are affected as well as Availability since the
machine is unavailable to the user.
1.3.4 Probe Attacks
Probe attacks are scanning procedures an attacker follows to collect useful about po-
tential vulnerabilities a machine or an entire network has. Based on the gathered in-
formation the attacker can attempt to exploit the victim at a later stage [22].Through
it the Confidentiality principle is affected.
1.3.5 Buffer Overflow
Sometimes, due to poor programming code, applications and software have a se-
rious vulnerability. While data is being written to the buffer during a process, the
buffer’s boundary is overrun and nearby memory locations are overwritten. An at-
tacker can exploit this vulnerability through malformed inputs to gain unauthorised
access. Through it the Confidentiality and Integrity principles are affected [22].
1.3.6 Brute Force Attack
A brute force attack consists of an attacker attempting to break a password by trying
a great amount of random combinations to get it right [54]. Here, the Confidentiality
principle is affected [22].
1.3.7 Masquerading Attacks
In masquerading attacks, an adversary manages to steal the identity of a legitimate
user and masquerades themselves as normal entities in an attempt to exploit a system
or a network [22].
1.3.8 Datasets used in Intrusion Detection
1.3.8.1 DARPA Dataset
The MIT Lincoln Laboratory along with the Defence Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA ITO) and Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL/SNHS) have col-
laborated together to create an Intrusion Detection dataset from 1998-1999. The
DARPA 1998 dataset consists of seven weeks with normal and attack traffic. The
dataset set consists of two weeks of attack-free traffic, with one week of new attacks
along with the old ones from the DARPA 1998 dataset [23].
1.3.8.2 KDD-99 Dataset
The KDD-99 Dataset became public in 1999 and has been one of the most popular
IDS datasets used in literature. It has been based on the captured data of the DARPA
1998 dataset. It contais seven weeks of raw network traffic with an approximate total
of 4,900,000 connections. A total of 41 features have been suggested and were used
to differentiate between normal and malicious traffic. There are various types of
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cyber attacks present in the dataset. These attacks are categorised into four groups,
Denial of Service (DoS), User to Root (U2R), Remote to Local (R2L) and Probing
Attacks. DoS and Probing attacks have already been explained above. U2R denotes
a set of attacks in which the attacker manages to gain root access. R2L denotes a
set of attacks in which the attacker exploits a certain vulnerability to gain access to
a local machine in the network[24]. A newer version of the KDD99 dataset, the
NSL-KDD dataset, attempts to improve the KDD-99 dataset’s issues highlighted in
the literature’s studies[25].
1.3.8.3 ISCX IDS 2012 Dataset
In the ISCX IDS 2012 Dataset, various multi-stage attacks scenarios were conducted
such as SSH Brute Force attacks, (D)DoS attacks and through IRC Botnets and in-
ternal Infiltrating of the network[26].
1.3.8.4 ISCX IDS 2017 Dataset
In the ISCX IDS 2017 Dataset, multi-stage attacks scenarios were conducted with
more diversity. Some examples were various (D)DoS ADoS slowloris , DoS Slowhttptest,
DoS Hulk, DoS LOIT and DoS GoldenEye as well as the botnet ARES. Brute Force
attacks were also conducted such as SSH and Brute Force attacks. Also, web-based
attacks were conducted such as web Brute Force ,XSS and SQL Injection. Finally,
port-scan maliucious behaviour was simulated [27].
1.3.8.5 Botnet Dataset
In the Botnet Dataset, various botnets were used to attack the network such as Neris,
Rbot, Virut, NSIS,IRCBot , Menti, Sogou, Zeus, Weasel, SmokeBot, Murlo [28].
1.3.8.6 CIC DoS dataset
In the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity (CIC) DoS dataset, the attack behaviour
was focused on Application Layer (D)DoS attacks. The attacks conducted were
high-volume as well as low-volume. The High-volume attacks were HTTP GETs,
DNS queries, SIP INVITEs. The Low-volume attacks were low-rate attacks, Apache
Range Header attack, Slow-Rate DoS Slowhttptest, DoS Hulk, DoS LOIT and DoS
GoldenEye [29].
1.3.8.7 The AWID dataset
The AWID dataset has been constructed in 2015 and consists of a dataset with normal
and attack traffic targetting 802.11 networks [30].
1.3.8.8 The UNSW-NB15 dataset
The UNSW-NB 15 dataset was constructed by the Cyber Range Lab of the Australian
Centre for Cyber Security (ACCS) consisting both normal and attack data. This data
set has nine types of attacks, namely, Fuzzers, Analysis, Backdoors, DoS, Exploits,
Generic, Reconnaissance, Shellcode and Worms [31].
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1.4 Bio/Nature-Inspired Algorithms Studies in Intrusion
Detection
1.4.1 Game Theoretic Studies
The authors in [32] used GT with Nash Equilibrium. They designed a cooperative
IDS in an attempt to increase accuracy and to detect new threats. The authors pro-
posed a trust management framework so the IDSs could be connected in a trustful
way, reduce the impact for compromised IDSs and reduce the false positive rates
and be scalable. When an IDS evaluates traffic to detect potential DoS attacks but
has limited knowledge it seeks help from other IDS by sending requests to gain extra
feedback from them. There is a central component that organizes the communication
between the different IDSs. The authors evaluated their solution against DoS attack
so when a malicious node is detected it is removed from the network.
The authors in [33] also used Game Theory to prevent and detect (D)DoS attack
in Ad Hoc Networks. The game theory concept was applied as a form of multiplayer
game in combination with cryptographic puzzles. In an ad-hoc network, when a node
wishes to send a request it needs to solve a puzzle first and then become a member
in a group. The nodes belong to each group play a multiplayer game that is divided
into 2-player sub-games. The winner of each group, (highest score) is served by the
requested node. The games are continued until all requests are served. In the end,
there will be one player left at each group. In that case, that game is played between
the last node and the node responsible for authorizing the requests. By doing that the
authors ensure that the bulk of the computation overhead is handled by the requesting
node which checks the winning results. In case of a malicious node is already present
in the network it will need to process a high computation puzzle. The authors found
that the optimal number of players for each group would be between 2 and 20. The
solution also is efficient for the ad hoc nodes of the network.
1.4.2 Evolution Strategies Studies
The authors in [34] have suggested an online intrusion detection framework able to
detect SIP Flooding attacks using various Evolutionary Algorithms, including Evolv-
ing Radial Basis Function, Fuzzy Ada Boost, Genetic Classifier, Extended Classifier,
Supervised Classifier and Continuous Ant Miner Classifier. Their framework con-
sists of six components. The packet sniffer captures the SIP Traffic and stores it in
a buffer, which can hold up to 500 packets. As soon as this buffer is full the feature
extractor component begins analysing the packets and extracts values for a set of fea-
tures selected. These features are invite, register, bye, ack, options, cancel, update,
refer, subscribe, notify, message, info and prack requests. The values of the features
are normalized according to the total number of SIP request messages. The features
also include response messages, such as the number of Success, Redirection, Client
Error, Server Error, Global Error that are normalized according to the total number
of SIP messages. With the help of rules generated from the Evolutionary Algorithms
it is decided if there is an attack. Supervised Classifier and Extended Classifier have
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been proved to be effective with 82.17% and 77.00% against chunk flood attacks and
harmonic flood attacks..
The authors in [35] use ES to generate rules to match anomalous connections
from the DARPA Dataset, including DoS and (D)DoS attacks. As they have stated in
their work, the majority of research is focused on GA approaches so they are the first
to use ES to generate rules for detecting anomalous connections. The attributes the
authors have used for detecting anomalies are the source IP address, the destination
IP address, the source port, the destination port, the duration of the connection, the
state, the protocol, the number of bytes sent by the source and the number of bytes
sent by the destination nodes. The range of values for each attribute have a prede-
fined set of values and use ES to find the optimal range. The authors do not present
experimental results, although their suggestion is important for research.
1.4.3 Genetic Algorithms Studies
There are numerous studies that make usage of genetic algorithms to detect various
cyber attacks. GA is an excellent algorithm for optimising the features used in intru-
sion detection, managing to not only reduce the overall complexity of the system but
also achieve a better detection rate against various cyber attacks.
The authors in [36] designed an IDS for MANETs using GA to detect black hole
and dropping routing DoS attacks. They defined a set of characteristics for the GA
algorithm to consider (whether connections was from/to similar port/host, number
of wrong fragments within the connection, connection SYN errors, percentage of
connections to similar/desimilar services and hosts and so on). Using a trained set
they constructed the population. Then, by introducing the test data to the GA and by
performing analysis (selection, crossover, mutation), test data were categorized. The
authors report a detection rate of 95%.
In [37], the authors have designed a multi-layer approach intrusion detection
system by using the genetic algorithm. They followed a multi-layer IDS to detect
attacks from the KDD99 Dataset. Each layer operate as a filter for each group of at-
tacks (there were four layer, one for each group of attacks) and blocks any malicious
activity so there is no need for further investigation. The authors report that as the
number of rounds of the GA is increased so does the accuracy of the results but the
complexity as well. They report an overall of 90% of potential accuracy but the time
complexity is reported to be relatively high.
The authors in [38], have also made usage of GA to detect the same family of
attacks from the KDD99 Dataset in wireless networks. They have compared their
results with other studies, which consist of studies using ALRFC, and their solution
is reported to have a detection rate 95.67% training accuracy and 97.57% testing
accuracy. They have also made usage of only 16 features to achieve these results
from a total of 41 features.
1.4.4 Fuzzy Logic Studies
In intrusion detection, FL is often used in combination with other bio-inspired al-
gorithmic techniques such as GA. The authors in [39] combined GA with FL to
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detect KDD99 set of attacks, including DoS attacks. For the detection using the GA
algorithm they have used a set of characteristics; source IP address, destination IP
address, connection duration, protocol type, source port, destination port, and des-
tination host service. With FL specific rules, the detection rate is increased and the
error rate is decreased when the input is ambiguous. The results indicate that solution
being more accurate, faster and lighter in computational resources than GA and FL
when used separately. Specifically, the detection rate is high (>95%), the execution
time is 12,500 milliseconds and the memory allocation in less than 25 MBs.
In [40] the authors have combined the GA along with FL to create the Fuzzy Ge-
netic Algorithm (FGA) for their research. The algorithm was detecting all the attacks
from the KDD99 Dataset . The algorithm commences by randomly choosing rules
and then using the evolutionary algorithm to improve the rules during the training
phase. Then, during the testing phase the final rules are used for classification of the
testing data. The new algorithm was trained with traffic collected by the researchers
themselves and can also detect unknown attacks. Through a series of experiments
the FGA has detection rate percentage above 95% and false positive rate less than
1%.
GA was also used as a feature selection technique before proceeding to the de-
tection part. In [41] the authors have used GA to choose the most relevant and accu-
rate for detection features from the KDD99 dataset. In that way, the authors aimed
to perform a faster, lighter and more accurate detection. For the detection part, a
Support Vector Machine (SVM)-fuzzy based algorithm was used for detection. Au-
thors’ report claims their results are better when using their solution rather than SVM
by itself or the SVM-fuzzy algorithm without the GA performing the feature selec-
tion. Specifically for the detection of DoS attacks, the detection rate is reported to be
98.3% and the error rate to be 2.7%.
The authors in [42], have used fuzzy logic to detect (D)DoS jamming attacks
at the Physical and MAC layers in IEEE 802.15.4 low rate wireless personal area
networks. They have taken into consideration bad packet and signal-to-noise ratios
to detect such attacks. Bad Packet ratio is measured at the receiver side and consists
of the total number of bad packets received by a node, divided by the total number
of all packets received by the node, over a specific amount of time. Signal-to-Noise
ratio consists of the ratio of the received signal power at a node to the received noise
at the node. A collection of objects has a fuzzy set which maps each object of the
collection to a membership value (by applying a membership function to it) from 0
to 1. In this case two set of objects exist, one for the signal-to-noise ratio and one for
bad packet ratio. Through fuzzification, each of the two values produced from the
two metrics fall among low, medium and high. According to certain rules one final
result is produced that is defuzzied and a final decision is made on whether there is
jamming attack or not. Throughout simulating different types of jamming attacks
the detection rate has an average of 99.75% and a false positive rate of 0.01%
1.4.5 Swarm Intelligence Studies
The authors in [43] used the Ant-Colony-Optimisation (ACO) to detect UDP DoS
attacks on port 7, specifically Fraggle and Teardrop attacks. The agents (ants) iter-
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atively monitor the network activity flow. More specifically, each ant represents an
IDS agent, which is responsible for monitoring the network activity. Each agent/ant
moves from a state/step a to a state/step b, where each state represents network pat-
tern knowledge. On each state, depending on the incoming packets received, a set
of feasible expansions to the ant colony is calculated and the agent moves to the
highest probability expansion. The probability for each move is calculated based on
step attractiveness and step trail. Trails values are automatically updated when all
agents/ants complete their state transiting. An increase or decrease on trail levels
indicates a good move/legitimate behavior or a bad move/malicious behavior. The
results indicate that the detection rate is reaching 80%.
The authors in [44] used the Ant-Colony-Optimisation algorithm and focused
on detecting low-rate (D)DoS attacks. The system firstly collects information from
incoming traffic such as traffic flow, packet arrival time, packet attack rate and ar-
rival time interval by manual setting. Next, the multi-agents installed in the network
are working cooperatively towards the detections of malicious activity and tracking
down the IP addresses of the attackers in a cooperative way. To change state, the
traffic flow and time density from router to router is calculated. The proposed tech-
nique can also be used to detect attacks in neighboring paths. The average detection
rate is 89%.
The authors in [45] designed an Intrusion Detection System to detect attacks of
the KDD99 Dataset, including various types of (D)DoS attacks using the Ant Colony
Optimisation algorithm. To detect anomalies in the traffic they used IP Protocol
segments, the total length of each packet, the source port and destination port in the
TCP and UDP. They report that their algorithm has a precision of 96.94%.
In [46] the authors have used theArtificial Bee Colony algorithm to detect vari-
ous MANET-specific attacks such as Flooding attacks, Balckhole attacks and Worm-
hole attacks. The authors extend the ABC algorithm to dynamically update the gen-
erated profile as MANET networks are not static (due to the nodes mobility). Their
system has three stages, training, detection and update states. Each of the nodes in
the MANET create a set of spherical detectors. The ABC algorithm applies Monte
Carlo estimation to prevent the overcreation of detectors and Gaussian Local Search
to refine the detectors generated. The spherical detectors are responsible for differ-
netiating malicious from normal behaviour. The spherical detectors at regular time
intervals are partially updated. Monte Carlo estimates when the detectors shall be to-
tally updated. In their results, they report a Detection Rate 96.11% with FPR 1.45%.
The authors in [47] combined PSO with Fast Learning Networks (FLN) which
is a specific type of ANN to detect malicious activity in the KDD99 dataset. FLN
comes with the disadvantage of not consisting of optimal weights. Hence, its accu-
racy is decreased. For that reason, the auhors use PSO to select optimal weights for
the neurons. PSO creates particles, each of them representing one candidate solu-
tion for the weights of the FLN. The authors have compared their solution to other
types of ALRFC such as Evolutionary Learning Models and showing that their so-
lution has supprassed related solutions. Furthermore, they report he accuracy has
increased for all models with increasing the number of hidden neurons. In detail,
they report a TP rate for Normal Traffic of 99.7%, for (D)DoS attacks 98.11%, for
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User to Root Attacks 80.40%, for Remote To Local Attacks 54.55% and for Probe
Attacks 80.01%.
1.4.6 Artificial Neural Network Studies
In most of the bio/nature-inspired studies for intrusion detection, ALRFC are used
in combination with other bio/nature-inspired algorithms that their main objective is
to optimise the features. Some notable studies are briefly described below.
The authors in [48] used a combination of SI and ANN to detect malicious ac-
tivity in the KDD99 dataset. In detail, they have made usage of the ABC algorithm
with a BP ANN in an attempt to construct an effective neural network architecture
to avoid overfitting problems. The authors justify their choice through the follow-
ing argument: the ABC algorithm’s objective is to optimise the BP neural network’s
training process(construction of network weights and thresholds, initial training val-
ues) until it reaches an acceptable accuracy. For evaluating the model they have used
10% of the KDD dataset. They report a squared error of approximately less than
0.25, while a traditional BP neural network is higher.
In [49], the authors have combined the GA along with ANN, attempting to in-
crease the detection rate. The have used the Center for Applied Internet Data Analy-
sis (CAIDA) dataset. The GA was used for feature selection to find the most impor-
tant features from a total of 43 and exclude all the irrelevant or redundant ones. The
ANN was used for detection by taking the most relevant features as inputs, using the
MLP method for defining the architecture. The proposed solution had a detection
rate of 99.997% and a False Positive Rate of 0.002%.
In [50], the authors designed a Neural Network IDS to detect DoS attacks with
the KDD99 Dataset. They used the LVQ algorithm to structure the architecture of
the neural network. They conducted the experiment 10 times using both BP and
LVQ algorithms to compare results. The ANN using the LVQ algorithm achieved an
average DR of 99.723% and a 0.277% FPR, while the BP-ANN achieved an average
DR 89.9259% and a 0% FPR.
The authors in [51] have used ANNs and the MLP method to detect DoS attacks
in the NSL-KDD dataset (11 in total). They have constructed 11 different MPL-
Neural Networks one responsible for detecting each attack. They have altered the
features that are normally used to train the neural network differently. Specifically,
they changed the connection feature. If the ”connection” is legitimate the feature
value is set to 0. If it is malicious it is set to 1-39, depending on the attack it corre-
sponds to. For the flag feature instead of Boolean value they have defined 11 flags,
each corresponding to a different state of the connection. Lastly, service now indi-
cates 64 different kinds of services. In their results they report an average detection
rate of 96.6% and a false positive rate of 3.4%
The authors in [52] have used MLP Artificial Neural Networks to detect (D)DoS
attacks in the AMI of the Smart Grid. Their proposed method consists of three
phases, the training, the feature extraction and traffic filtering phases. The features
chosen are the packet headers, source and destination port, windows size and flags.
The authors were particularly interested to evaluate their proposed method under
the possibility of accepting impure traffic. Impure traffic consists of malicious traf-
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fic mixed with normal traffic. They have tested their technique under five impure
datasets they have created. They report the best results to have a false acceptance
rate of less than 8% and the false rejection rate to be less than 5%.
The authors in [53] have used Artificial Neural Networks to detect (D)DoS at-
tacks in 802.16 (WiMax) networks, which is used in the Smart Grid, The proposed
system consists of three stages, feature extraction, process of the features and fea-
tures forward to the Neural Network for classification. The features extracted are
the hurst parameter incoming traffic, the average bit rate of received messages, the
increment bit rate of the received message, the entropy and conditional entropy of
received MAC address and the amount of mutual information that use entropy and
conditional entropy of the received packet. For the maximum number of subseries
size (=256) the maximum true positive rate is 85% and the minimum false positive
rate is 15%.
1.4.7 Artificial Immune Systems Studies
The authors in [54] used a variation of the NSA, the Neighborhood Negative Selec-
tion (LRFC) algorithm to detect DoS flooding attacks focusing on the ICMP, TCP
and UDP protocols, from the DARPA dataset. NSA operates as follows: Normal
data are defined as self-patterns. Then a great number of random patterns is gener-
ated and compared to the self-patterns. If the new generated pattern matches one of
the self-pattern then it becomes a detector, otherwise it is discarded. Then, in the
monitoring state if there is a match between a detector and an incoming traffic part
then an anomaly is present. LRFC has two stages. The system extracts from traffic
protocol type, duration of the flow, number of packets/bytes from outside to inside
and vice versa. In the first stage, feature extraction takes place and then the set is
used to train the algorithm. In the second stage, the LRFC algorithm is used for
detection. Neighborhoods represent data, so therefore no single threshold is used to
detect anomalies but rather a quantitative approach is adopted. The results indicate
that the proposed system can detect the attacks in an efficient way. In detail, the TN
rate has not fallen below 8.5% and the maximum value for FN rate was no more than
15%.
The authors in [55] apply the CSA (AIS) algorithms. They proposed an IDS for
the Smart Grid infrastructure. The attacks considered were from the KDD99 dataset
and the DoS group of attacks were included. The false positive rate (FPR) is only
0.7% while the false negative rate (FNR) is 21.02% for the clonal selection algorithm
and 1.3% and 26.32% for the AIS, respectively. Their high FNR value is because
of the U2R attacks so it is assumed that the proposed solution is effective against
DoS attacks. U2R attack (User-to(2)-Root) is when the attacker initiates the attack
as a normal user and by exploiting the systems vulnerabilities attempts to gain root
privileges.
The authors in [56] focused in detecting SYN-Flooding attacks using DCA.
DCA correlates the different data-streams as signals and antigens. The signals rep-
resent the behavior of the system while being categorised. The output signal value
changes according to the input signals received. If that value changes in an abnormal
way it is removed from the population for analysis. Two series of experiments were
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conducted, one for selecting the best attributes to pass them to the algorithm and
another for the actual detection. Through a series of experiments the authors claim
perfect detection rate and only 0.17 FPR.
The authors in [57] have used AIS generation algorithms in the NSL-KDD
dataset. In particular, they have used Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) and the
Clonal Selection Algorithm (CSA) with different set of features at each experiment.
For the NSL-KDD dataset, the authors found the following thresholds showed the
most promising results: 39 features used a threshold of 20, 22 features used a thresh-
old of 9, and 13 features used a threshold of 6. For 39 features the DR is 86.86 , for
22 features the DR is 77.23 and for 13 21.56.
In [58] the authors have used AIS to design a distributed IDS to detect cyber
attacks in the KDD99. Two types of antibodies are constructed (through positive
and negative selection), one for malicious and one for normal traffic. In practice,
antibodies are formed as hyper-shpere shapes with a specific centre and radius. The
centre is denoted as a vector of the values for the features chosen. Hence, Euclidean
distance is adopted for affinity measurement. Furthermore, the authors used Particle
Swarm Optimisation for updating the radiuses of the antigens. Through their sim-
ulation experiments, it is shown that the proposed algorithm achieved 99.1% true
positive rate while the false positive rate is 1.9%
The authors in [59] have developed a multiple detector which consists of various
types of AIS algorithms to detect attacks from the UNB ISCX Intrusion Detection
Evaluation Dataset using various features such as connection duration, protocol type,
service, flag type, source and destination ports and so on. Their results show the
multiple-detector set artificial immune system achieved a Detection Rate of 53.34%
and a False Positive Rate of 0.20%.
The authors in [60] the authors have used Genetic Algorithm with one-point
crossover instead of two to find an optimal set of features before using ML algorithms
for detecting attacks from the NSL-KDD dataset. Multiple popular supervised clas-
sifiers were used on the dataset such as Random Forest, Decision Trees, K-Nearest
Neighbour, Naive Bayes and Bayesian Networks. The authors report Random Forest
as the algorithm producing the best results. The best ML algorithm was Random
Forest with 99.87% DR.
1.4.8 Chaos Theory Studies
Most of the studies making usage of chaos, also use ALRFC for the effective mal-
ware and intrusions detections. Below, we briefly present some notable studies that
combine Chaos Theory with ALRFC.
In [61], the authors have created a (D)DoS detection system to detect (D)DoS
attacks but also be robust against legitimate bursts of traffic. They aimed to discover
patterns that can define how legitimate traffic behaves. Based on their observations
they developed a baseline to use it to train their neural network model to detect
(D)DoS attacks.
Their system uses self-similarity theory to construct a self-similar neural net-
work model to monitor the traffic and Chaos Theory’s local lyapunov exponents to
distinguish between normal behaviour and (D)DoS attack. Normal and attack traf-
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fic are represented in a space graph. These points are the mappings of a non-linear
function of the input variables, which includes sequences of normal, bursty normal
and normal changed to attack traffic. It is assumed that legitimate traffic diminishes
asymptotically with time. However, if traffic behaves chaotically as soon as new traf-
fic enters the space then it is likely there is a (D)DoS attack. They report a detection
rate of 88-94 % with a false positive of 0.45-0.05 %.
Based on the findings and the methods used in [61], the authors in [62] have
followed a similar approach, managing to imrpove the detection rate. In detail, they
have once again used chaos theory’s lyapunov exponents in a combination with neu-
ral networks to detect (D)DoS attacks. They report a 98.4% detection rate, however
they don’t give any details regarding any false positive or false negative rates.
In [63], the authors again use the local Lyapunov exponent in combination with
the ALRFC to detect a (D)DoS attack from the DARPA Dataset. They have used
information regarding the packets flow to differentiate between (D)DoS traffic and
normal burst traffic. With the results they gained they trained their Neural Network
model to correctly detect (D)DoS attacks. The chaos theory model they used the
AR time model to predict the network traffic and calculate the error rate. They used
DARPA dataset to evaluate their work and claimed 93.75% detection rate.
1.5 Case Study: Application Layer (D)DoS Detection
Smart Homes consist of a great number of different devices, all deployed in a single
network monitoring the environment, collecting and sharing important data and in-
formation with the owners and other smart IoT devices and external services through
internal and external networks. The node responsible for this communication is the
Energy Services Interface (ESI). It acts as a bi-directional interface where informa-
tion can be exchanged between the Smart Home and external do- mains. Further-
more, it protects internal energy resources from security failures and ensures secure
internal communication between the devices deployed in the Smart Home. ESIs im-
portance to the Smart Home and in the outside domains makes it an excellent target
for cyber attacks.
(D)DoS attacks can be conducted across all the layers of the TCP/IP model.
Application layer (D)DoS attacks are much more harder to be detected efficiently
and accurately than their perspective ones in lower layers as they do not violate
any protocol rules or make usage of malicious behaviour. The TCP connections
are established successfully and normal requests are sent to the target, in contrast to
(D)DoS attacks in lower layer such as the TCP Flooding which sends a burst amount
of SYN packets without acknowledging the SYN,ACK packets sent from the server.
The Application Layer Flooding instead sends a burst amount of legitimate requests
to the server, which the server cannot refuse but to reply. As a result, it becomes
unresponsive due to great amount of incoming requests. On the contrary, Slow-Rate
Application Layer (D)DoS attack exploits a servers ability to wait for a connections
to be completed in a range of time, if the incoming connection is legitimately slow.
As long as the client manages to send a subsequent packet in an attempt to complete
the request the server is obliged to keep the connection open. Based on that, the
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slow-rate attack opens a great number of connections and initiates requests that never
completes them. As time is passing by, more and more connections are open and that
results in the target becoming once again unresponsive.
Based on these issues and concerns, it is important to develop effective security
countermeasures to detect (D)DoS attacks in such critical systems. However, the
majority of devices deployed in IoT networks are low in resouces such as memory,
processing power and power. Therefore, it is important for the detection algorithms
to be as lightweight as possible. Since, the most popular detection algorithms used
belong to Artificial Intelligence and Machine learning it is even more important since
they are particularly high in complexity and need a large dataset to be trained. One
effective way to reduce an algorithm’s complexity is to reduce the features. In that
way, the algorithms are going to be trained faster, in less time and the model con-
structed is going to be less complex. nTherefore, we have constructed an Smart
Home IoT dataset which consists of both legitimate and Application Layer Flooding
and Slow-Rate (D)DoS attacks. The dataset consists of 197 attack instances and 257
normal instances.
1.5.1 Evaluation Environment
1.5.2 NS-3 Network Simulator
For the simulation of the Smart Home network, Network Simulator 3 (NS3) was
used. Network Simulator 3 (NS3) is an open-source discrete-event simulator devel-
oped in C++. A summary of the networks parameters and protocols used is given in
Table 1.2 . Various IoT devices are deployed in the Home Area Network that con-
nect to the gateway, called ESI, to exchange data with the Smart City infrastructures.
For our IoT Smart Home network simulation, 10 nodes were simulated. 9 of them
represent IoT devices and Smart Appliances and the final node forms the ESI. All
simulated nodes were static, with no mobility. In the physical layer, all the connec-
tions were wireless and the 802.11 protocol was used. The structure was set to ad
hoc, using AODV routing protocol . In the network layer IPv4 was used and in the
transport layer both UDP and TCP were used. In the application layer a wide variety
of application layer protocols were simulated including CoAP, MQTT, XMPP and
AMQP and HTTP.
1.5.3 Simulation of (D)DoS attacks
Our proposed algorithms accuracy is evaluated through experiments. Related (D)DoS
detection studies make usage of popular datasets such as the KDD99, DARPA 1998
or NSL-KDD Datasets. However, we cannot use these datasets as they do not have
IoT traffic nor they contain application layer (D)DoS attacks. In IoT networks the
traffic is highly heterogeneous, therefore harder to detect any malicious behaviour.
Hence, we had to create our own synthetic traffic using NS-3. A series of traffic con-
taining normal and attack traffic files were generated. Both flooding and slow-rate
attacks were simulated. In every scenario, seven nodes from the Smart Home were
generating normal traffic and the remaining two were generating malicious traffic.
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Table 1.2 Smart Home Protocols
Layer Protocol SH/SG-Substations/SG-AMI
Physical 802.11
Data-Link SSID
Network IPv4
Transport TCP
Application HTTP, MQTT, CoAP, XMPP
In order for both normal and attack traffic to be simulated, degree of randomness
was added in the network packet gen- eration from the nodes. Randomness was
introduced through Poisson Distribution in the following metrics, at the time a packet
was created and sent from the client to the server, at the size of the packet generated
from both the client and the server and at the time the server needed to respond.
Different speeds were also applied in IoT nodes to service application layer requests.
Hence, we can simulate slow connections that are legitimate.
Most of the (D)DoS attacks, Flooding types in particular, can be classified as
constant rate. In constant rate attacks, the attackers generate a high steady rate of
traffic towards the target [5]. The impact of such an attack is fast, but it can easily
be detected due to the its obvious intensity. Hence, attackers have moved towards
more sophisticated ways of conducting (D)DoS attacks. One way to evade any secu-
rity measures installed is to slowly but steadily flood the target in an increasing-rate
attack, where the maximum impact of the attack is reached gradually over the at-
tack period. To simulate increased-rate attacks in NS-3, we used open random con-
nections after random time-intervals. To assess the results on ForChaos algorithms
effectiveness we have calculated the most popular metrics used when assessing a
detection algorithms accuracy.
These are Detection Rate(DR), Error Rate (ER), True Positives(TP), False Pos-
itives (FP), False Negatives (FN) and Precision. In intrusion detection positives in-
stances are attacks and negative instances are normal. DR measures the algorithms
proportion in correctly classifying incoming instances and ER measures the algo-
rithms proportion errors incorrectly classifying incoming instances. DR and ERs
sum equals one. TP measures the proportion of positive instances that are correctly
identified as such. FP measures the proportion of negative instances to have been
misclassified as positive. FN measures the proportion of positive instances that have
been misclassified as negative. Lastly, precision measures the proportion of relevant
instances among the retrieved instances. Hence, precision measures the rate of true
positives divided by all the positives, both correctly and incorrectly classified.
1.5.4 Feature Selection
Most of the studies using forecasting techniques against (D)DoS attacks mentioned
in the previous section usually make usage of a single feature for prediction and
detect the possible deviations in the number of packets, the number of packets per
IP, the packet flags and so on. However, these studies focus on detecting (D)DoS
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Table 1.3 List of Features
Feature Name Description
Requests No
Total number of requests
in a time-series interval
Packets No
Total number of packets
in a time-series interval
Data Rate
Average data rate
in a time-series interval
Avg Packet Size
Average packet size in a time-
series interval
Avg Time Betw Requests
Average time between two
requests in a time-series interval
Avg Time Betw
Response & Request
Average time between the
response and the first requests
encountered in a time-series interval
Avg Time Betw Responses
Average time between two
responses in a time-series interval
Parallel Requests
Total number of parallel requests
in a time-series interval
attacks on lower layers and not on the application layer. The adoption of one single
feature on the application layer is likely not to produce satisfactory results since
Application (D)DoS attacks do not violate any protocol rules and do not produce
malformed packets. Therefore we have designed a new set of features to detect
Application Layer Flooding and Slow-rate (D)DoS attacks. All of the features are
heavily dependent on time and form ideal features for forecasting-based algorithms
and presented in Table 1.3.
1) Requests Number: In a flooding scenario the number of requests over a
period of time will be much greater compared to normal traffic request rates. In a
slow-rate attack scenario the number of requests over two consecutive periods of
time will have large difference. Since slow-rate opens connections to send requests
after an amount of minutes there will be a pattern of low number of requests, then
high number of requests, then low and so on.
2) Packets Number: In a flooding attack the number of packets on application
layer is rapidly increased over a short period of time. In a slow-rate attack the number
of packets is lower due to the packets being sent slowly, just before a request can be
rejected. Hence, the request stays alive but very few packets are sent.
3) Data Rate: In a flooding attack the data rate on application layer is rapidly
increased over a short period of time. In a slow-rate attack the data rate is lower due
to the slow data rate of the malicious requests.
4) Average Packet Size: In a flooding attack the average packet size is de-
creased due to the requests being simply a get request with no payload. In a slow-rate
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attack the average size packet is decreased since a great series of connections send
small incomplete packets over the attack period of time.
5) Average Time between Requests: In a flooding attack the average time
between each request is vastly decreased due to an outburst of requests being sent
over a short period of time simultaneously. In a slow-rate attack the average time
between each request is decreased compared to the same value in a normal scenario.
Instead, there are spikes of the number of requests being sent. When the attack is
at the stage of opening new requests, their rate is increased. When the attack is at
the stage of maintaining the connections open, normal subsequent packets are sent,
therefore, the rate of the requests is less than the previous stage.
6) Average Time between Response and Request: In a flooding attack the
average time between a response and the next request is vastly decreased. In a slow-
rate attack the average time between a response and the next request the slow-rate
attack causes malicious requests.
7) Average Time between Responses: In a flooding attack, the average time
between two consecutive responses is vastly decreased since a burst of requests is
being sent to the server, therefore a great number of responses have to be gener-
ated. In a slow-rate attack, the same feature is increased since the slow-rate attack’s
requests are initiated but never completed.
8) Parallel Requests: In a flooding attack the average concurrent requests is
decreased since the attackers send multiple requests that are very quickly finished.
In a slow-rate attack, many requests are initiated and stay open over a period of time
and the average number of parallel open requests is large.
1.5.5 Intrusion Detection Evaluation Metrics
In the Intrusion Detection Literature, studies use an extended series of evaluation
metrics and statistical tests to asses their detection engines performance. Measuring
the system’s detection rate is not enough sometimes, therefore to provide a more
hollistic evaluation, different metrics are adopted. In this section, we briefly describe
the most popular evaluation metrics, the actual formulas and their application in
Intrusion Detection. In Intrusion Detection research, the presence of a cyber attack
is regarded as a positive instance and the absence of it as a negative instance.
True Positive Rate
True Positive Rater (TPR) or otherwise called Recall or Sensitivity, is when the
detection algorithm is able to correclty identify an instance as an attack.
True Negative Rate
True Negative Rater (TNR) or otherwise called Specificity, is when the detection
algorithm is able to correclty identify an instance as normal.
False Positive Rate
False Positive Rate (FPR), or otherwise called Fall-Out, is when the detection
alglorithm has incorrectly classified an instance as an attack, with it being normal.
False Negative Rate
False Negeative Rate (FNR) is when the detection alglorithm has incorrectly
classified an instance as normal, with it being an attack.
Precision
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Table 1.4 Machine Learning Algorithms Results against Application Layer
(D)DoS Attacks Smart Home IoT dataset with 8 Features
Alg (Dataset) DR (%) TP (%) FP (%) TN (%) FN (%) Prec (%)
NB(1) 89.54 83.8 5.9 94.1 16.2 91.9
BN(1) 91.50 80.9 0 100 8.50 100
SVM(1) 88.24 73.5 0 100 26.5 100
KNN(1) 98.69 97.1 0 100 1.31 100
DT(1) 95.42 97.1 5.9 94.1 2.9 93
RF(1) 96.73 97.1 3.5 96.5 2.9 95.7
MLP(1) 98.69 98.5 1.2 98.8 1.5 98.5
DeepMLP(1) 95.42 89.7 0 100 10.3 100
Precision, or otherwise called positive predictive value, denotes the rate at which
the detection algorithm has correctly classified True Positive instances out of all
the positive instances it has classified. In general, Precision denotes the fraction of
instances that are relevant from the total number of all retrieved instances.
1.5.6 Experiments Results Analysis
As it has been highlighted in [60, 47, 46, 49, 39, 40, 41], bio/nature-inspired al-
gorithms have been used for feature reduction in an attempt to reduce the overall
compexity of detection algorithms without affecting their accuracy. For finding an
optimal set of features, we have used the available nature-inspired algorithms pro-
vided from Weka toolkit. Specifically, we used evolutionary search, ant and bee
search, genetic search and particle swarm optimisation search algorithms. All algo-
rithms have identified Parallel Requests, Average Data Rate, Average Packet Size
and Packet Number as the necessary features. The Machine Learning algorithms
used were Random Forests (RF), Decision Trees (DT), K-Nearest Neighbour, SVM,
Bayesian Networks, Naive Bayesian, Multi-Layer Perceptron Artifcial Neural Net-
work, Deep Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) Artifcial Neural Network, Two series
of experiments have been conducted, one with all eight features and one with four
features.
1.5.7 Results Analysis and Discussion
From our experiments, it was observed that the overall detection rate has been vastly
decreased across all algorithms when the features were reduced. The specific rates
are enlisted in Table 1.4 (with 8 features) and in Table 1.5 (with 4 features).
Detection rate: MLP and KNN have performed best with 8 features, both with
98.69%, followed by RF with 96.74%,DT and Deep-MLP with 95.42%, and then
BN with 91.50%, NB with 89.54% and SVM with 88.24%.
In the series of experiments using 4 features KNN has still been the most ac-
curate in classifying unknown traffic but MLP’s detection rate has been dropped. In
detail, KNN comes first in terms of detection rate, followed by SVM, MLP, BN,
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Table 1.5 Machine Learning Algorithms Results against Application Layer
(D)DoS Attacks Smart Home IoT dataset with 4 Features
Alg (Dataset) DR (%) TP (%) FP (%) TN (%) FN (%) Prec (%)
NB(1) 86.61 82 7.8 92.2 18 92.6
BN(1) 89.29 85.2 5.9 94.1 14.8 94.5
SVM(1) 89.29 82 2 98 18 98
KNN(1) 93.75 93.4 5.9 94.1 6.6 95
DT(1) 88.39 88.5 11.8 88.2 11.5 90
RF(1) 88.39 90.2 13.7 86.3 9.8 88.7
MLP(1) 89.29 86.9 7.8 92.2 13.1 93
DeepMLP(1) 87.5 83.6 7.8 92.2 16.4 92.7
DT, RF, Deep-MLP and NB. Based on the results, we can observe that KNN’s dis-
tance metrics is accurate enough regardless of the features involved for effectively
differentiating between normal and attack traffic.
The reduction of features clearly negatively affects MLP, Deep-MLP, RF and
DT’s accuracy. The feature reduction makes the ALRFC models’ characteristics
such as the connections between the layers, weights and number of hidden layer in
the Deep-MLP less complex but also less accurate. The model generated is too sim-
plistic to identify the kind of incoming traffic. Also, the reduction of features makes
DT and RF models to create less compelx trees that has the same negative effect.
On the other hand the probabilistic models used, BN and NB, are not particularly
negatively affected due to joint probabilities used. However, with the feature reduc-
tion the SVM algorithm’s detection rate is vastly increased. This could be because
the hyperplane constructed with less features is actually more accurate than with 8
features.
True Positive Rate: In the 8 features series of experiments, MLP achieves the
best TP rate with 98.5%. KNN RF and DT have the highest TP rates, all with 97.1%.
RF performed better than DT as expected due to RFs being an improved DT version.
The algorithms following are Deep-MLP with 89.7%, Naive Bayes 83.8%, Bayesian
Networks with 80.9% and SVM with 73.5%. The Deep-MLP model although having
a high TP, rate it can be highlighted that the construction of additional hidden layers
does not necessarily mean they are going to be more accurate in detecting attacks
so an MLP with a single hidden layer is a better solution. Also, it is indicated that
Probabilistic models and SVM have not been particularly effective in constructing
models to detect the attacks accurately enough.
In the 4 features series of experiments, the TP rate is generally decreased across
all algorithms. Only KNN and RF manage to get a TP rate above 90 with 93.4% and
90.2%. Then DT follows with 88.5%, MLP with 86.9%, BN with 85.2%, Deep-MLP
with 83.6% and lastly NB and SVM with 82%.
It is worth highlighting that the feture reduction vastly decreases the algorithms’
general accuracy and ability to detect the attacks. In sophisticated attacks such as the
Application Layer (D)DoS attacks, features play an important role in the construction
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of the algorithmic models. Based on both of these series of experiments, it is evident
that probabilistic approaches fail to identify the attack instances as BN and NB fail
to get a TP rate above at least 90%. This occurs because probabilistic models need
a large dataset to construct accurate and robust probabilities. Furthermore due to the
small dataset as well as the feature reduction, MLP and Deep-MLP failt to create
robust algorithmic models. On the other hand, KNN proves to be robust in detecting
unknown attacks along with RF and relatively DT.
False Positive Rate: In the series of 8 features BN, SVM, Deep-MLP and KNN
do not generate any FP instances. MLP generates a 1.2% FP rate, RF generates a
3.5% FP rate, and DT and NB generate 5.9% FP rate . In the series of 4 features
SVM generates 2% FP rate, BN and KNN generate 5.9% FP rate , MLP, Deep-MLP
and NB generate 7.8% FP rate , DT generates 11.8% and RF 13.7% FP rates. In
general, it is observed that with the reduction of features the FP rate is increased.
This indicates that the 4 features removed are quite important in understanding when
normal behaviour can have anomalies but still be normal.
1.6 Discussion
Without a doubt, the work done in the field of intrusion detection using bio-inspired
techniques is remarkable. There is a great diversity of different techniques used
to both reduce the features and/or detect the various types of malicious behaviour.
Bio/Nature-inspired algorithms have been proven particularly effective in finding an
optimal set of features that can achieve high rate of detection as well as a low rate of
false positives. This is particularly beneficial as it reduces the algorithmic complex-
ity of the detection model constructed as well as the time complexity. Furthermore,
through the studies it is highlighted that bio/nature-inspired algorithms are particu-
larly effective in detecting different types of attacks that may or may not belong in
the same attack family, such as the KDD99 Dataset.
As dsicussed above, studies achieve results of detection rate above 77% and
false positive rates not below 2.7% as illustrated in Table 1.6.
Artificial Neural Networks are proved the most effective in terms of the detec-
tion technique , achieving the highest detection rate with 99.72%. This is reflected
in the research literature as ANN is proved to be the most usable and popular bio-
inspired algorithm in intrusion detection.
However, ALRFC have an increased computational complexity [39]. To de-
crease and optimize the complexity threshold techniques, such as Genetic Algo-
rithms and Chaos Theory, could be applied . Hence, ANN will need fewer resources.
Game Theory is mainly used for preventing intrusions in systems. However,
its ability to define how network nodes in the system should communicate makes
it a suitable approach to detect malicious behaviour. For that reason the authors in
[14],[15] have applied a combination of computational puzzle with game theory to
prevent an attack rather than just detecting it. Game Theory can also be used for trust
management between the nodes participating in detection of threats in the system.
Genetic Algorithms have a better detection rate as shown in [36,37,38] than
Evolution Strategies [35] although both technologies follow a similar apporach. GA
“Sample”
2019/2/6
page 33
33
algorithms are behaving effectively, from resources allocation and execution time
[18], for feature reduction. In next generation, GA algorithms can be more effective
as the dataset can be diverse and provide better detection with fewer errors. This
is due to packet dropping, which is normal in communication networks, and it can-
not be considered an attack unless it is examined more carefully. GA algorithms
are behaving effectively for feature reduction before intrusion detection. Regarding
detection, GA is able to achieve a detection rate between 90-97.57% for KDD99 at-
tacks. This indicates that the Evolutionary approach GA follows is effective against
detecting different types of attacks as well as different variations of the same attack.
Also, GA is able to detect other types of (D)DoS attacks such as Grayhole and packet
Table 1.6 Bio/Nature-Inspired Algorithms Studies Results
Algorithm/ Attack Result
Ref.
GT [32] (D)DoS Attacks Prevention
GT [33] (D)DoS Attacks Prevention
EA [34] SIP Flooding Attacks 82.17% and 77.00%
ES [35] Darpa (D)DoS attacks No Results
GA [36] Blackhl. & Packt. Dr. 95%
GA [37] KDD99 Attacks 90%
GA [38] KDD99 Attacks 97.57%
GA & FL [39] KDD99 Attacks 95%
GA & FL [40] KDD99 Attacks 95% and 1% FPR
GA & FL [41] KDD99 Attacks 99.75%
FL [42] Jamming DoS 99.75%
ACO [43] UDP DoS 80%
ACO [44] Low-rate DoS 89%
ACO [45] KDD99 Attacks 96.94%
ABC & ANN [46] KDD99 Attacks less 0.025 squar er.
GA & ANN [49] KDD99 Attacks 99.997% DR and 0.002% FPR
ANN [50] KDD99 Attacks 99.723% DR and 0.277% FPR
ANN [51] NSL-KDD Attacks 96.6% DR and 3.4% FPR
ANN [52] KDD99 Attacks False Accept. less 8% & False Rej. less 5%.
ANN [53] (D)DoS 85% TPR
AIS [54] DARPA (D)DoS max TN 8.5% and max FN rate 15%
AIS [55] KDD99 FP 0.7% & FN 21.02% & 1.3% and 26.32%
AIS [56] SYN Attacks 100% TPT & 0.17 FPR
CT [61] (D)DoS Attacks 88-94 % & .45-0.05 % FPR
CT [62] (D)DoS Attacks 98.4%
CT [63] DARPA Attacks 93.75%
PSO with FLN [47] KDD-99 Norm. 99.7%, (D)DoS 98.11%, U2R 80.4%,R2L 54.55%, Probe 80.01%
AIS [57] NSL-KDD ] 86.8%
AIS [58] KDD-99 TPR 99.1% and FPR 1.9%
AIS [59] KDD-99 DR 53.34% and FPR 0.20%.
GA with RF [60] NSL-KDD 99.87% DR.
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dropping attacks as shown in [18] with a high detection rate (95%). GA can also be
used in combination with other bio/nature-inspired algorithms such as [39, 40, 41,
49]. In suc case, GA is used for feature reduction in an attempt to reduce complexity
of complex architectures (ANN and FL) without affecting the detection rate. This
objective is achieved as the detection rate is between 95-99.997%.
Artificial Immune Systems are particularly effective against intrusion detection
in distributed systems since there is no need for central coordinator. In [54] authors
detect (D)DoS attacks based on the AIS algorithm which is able to spread itself
across the network for monitoring. Therefore, (D)DoS attacks are detected faster
since the proposed Negative Search Structure algorithm is able to mix antibodies
and detect anomalies. In addition, from the studies of [54,55,56], it is shown that
their proposals produce low false positive rates since authors construct systems that
can immediately detect abnormal instances. Hence, AIS algorithm is able to detect
a wide range of (D)DoS attacks as well as other types of attacks, when KDD99 is
used. However, AIS has a relatively high false negative rate, between 15-26.32%
whereas the false positive rate remains low, between 0.17-1.3%.
SI achieve a respectable detection rate against a range of cyber attacks as they
take advantage of the algorithm’s cooperative nature to detect various types of attacks
that can be considered strealthy, such as low-rate (D)DoS attacks[44] and UDP DoS
attacks [43], achieving a good detection rate of 89% and 80% perspectively. In the
KDD99 attacks, SI algorithm is performing well while achieving a 96.94% detection
rate.
Fuzzy Logic also achieves high rates of detection as shown in [39, 40, 41, 42].
Fuzzy Logic is also effective in comparing classifications from many sources and
deciding if an instance is either malicious or normal. FL promotes collaborative
detection by effectively combining evidence from multiple IDS agents. Therefore,
it is able to detect the multiple and different cyber attacks contained in the KDD99
dataset with a detection rate between 95-98.3%. FL in [54] has also been used against
Jamming DoS attacks with a very high detection rate of 99.75%.
Finally, Chaos Theory is proved to also be a promising approach in detecting
abnormalities in real time traffic as shown in [61,62,63] when combined with AL-
RFC achieving a detection rate between 88-98.4% against various (D)DoS attacks in
different protocols.
Although the studies on bio-inspired techniques and their effective application in
intrusion detection seem more than promising, they certainly have some limitations.
Cyber-attacks have become highly sophisticated and an attacker can stealthy bypass
any security control.
It can be observed that current studies discuss how robust against cyber attacks
and (D)DoS attacks in particular. However, there is no indication on how to detect
compromised nodes/botnets acting maliciously. As a counter-example, an attacker
can constantly change IP addresses to bypass (D)DoS attack detection. In a similar
example, botnets can flood the network then sleep for a while and wake again to
carry on so as to avoid detection. There are no studies that target such scenarios.
This issue should have been at least considered since many (D)DoS attack scenarios
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are initiated from one machine being infected and gradually infecting the rest of the
network so they can all become a part of a large botnet.
Furthermore, the U2R and R2L scenarios included in the KDD-99 Dataset that
have been used in multiple studies. Although these malicious types of behaciour are
useful for detecting more complex cyber attacks scenarios none of the related studies
make usage of more complex cyber attack scenarios such as APTs. Hence, more
sophisticated and recent datasets shall be used to evaluate bio-inspired algorithms.
Unfortunately, only a few studies exist that make usage of bio-inspired algo-
rithms in the cyber physical systems [42,51,52,53,55]. Other techniques could also
be used to detect malicious behaviour in other cyber-physical systems such as the
Smart Grid, IoT networks and the Smart City. Firstly, Fuzzy Logic could be used
and be particularly effective. As seen from the studies of [39, 40, 41, 42], fuzzy logic
promotes collaboration, an essential concept for the detection of advanced persistent
attacks in distributed systems such Smart City networks.
Such systems are heterogeneous and complex, therefore, multiple information
must be collected from different intrusion detection sensors to identify if there is ma-
licious behavior present. Another method that could be proved particularly effective
for these infrastructures is the Swarm Intelligence algorithm since it also promotes
cooperation and it can be particularly effective against unknown attacks, or anomaly
detection. Chaos Theorys strong advantage is that it can capture legitimate behaviour
and define how much alteration can still be considered legitimate. Also, Chaos The-
ory could be used to detect other types of attacks that are relatively new, such as the
Application Layer (D)DoS attacks. Lastly, Game Theory would also be an effective
solution for preventing (D)DoS attacks.
In Smart City IoT networks and critical infrastructures there is a vast amount of
intelligent electronic devices interconnected together spread into large geographical
distances. Due to their close mutual operation they have higher possibilities of being
compromised and participate in botnet attacks.
Another observed limitation, is that researchers do not consider compromised
IDS agents before actually launching the DoS or (D)DoS attacks. If one or more
IDS agents are compromised, the attacker violates the trust between the IDS agents.
Hence the compromised agent can fool the network and act as legitimate. The only
studies that address this issue are [32] and [33]. Such scenarios are critical to the
system and can cause major consequences.
Additionally, bio-inspired techniques are proved to be particularly effective against
(D)DoS attacks as it can be seen from the studies. We still believe they can be just
as effective against other types of (D)DoS attacks, such as the slow rate attack in
the application layer [42]. Low rate and slow rate attacks follow similar approach
but take place in different OSI Layer. Hence, detection can be efficiently achieved
using bio-inspired techniques. Additional studies and extended experiments must be
conducted for such an assumption to be validated. In addition, other (D)DoS attacks
can be explored, such as the DNS Amplification attack;
There have been studies to defend systems against application layer (D)DoS
attacks but none of them have made usage of bio-inspired techniques or has examined
how to defend against such attacks in the IoT networks and critical infrastructures
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[53, 54, 55, 56]. However, since Smart Grid communicates on application level as
well, such attacks are possible to be conducted on such environment. Bio-inspired
techniques could be particularly effective in the Smart Grid due to its collaborative
nature.
Another direction to consider effective detection of cyber attacks in the Smart
Grid is the possibility of an attack being initiated from another infrastructure still
targeting the Smart Grid. One example of such a circumstance is Smart Homes and
the Internet of Things. Smart Homes are directly connected to the Smart Grid. It is
much easier for an adversary to compromise a number of Smart Home devices and
attack the Smart Grid than trying to harm the Smart Grid directly.
An important aspect to consider is that the majority of devices deployed in the
Smart Grid are low in resources. On the other hand most of the bio-inspired algo-
rithms are resources demanding. Therefore, possible changes to the algorithms could
be considered to make them lightweight and possibly adapt to such devices.
In the future several bio-inspired techniques may combined with other machine
learning techniques, such as in [41] with SVM. Mitigating approaches rather than
just detection be considered in the near future. Additionally, new solutions could
expand to hybrid attacks and increase security confidence in networked systems.
Although the techniques used in intrusion detection are wide in range, there is
still room for introducing new bio-inspired techniques as they could detect anomalies
in a given set using nature-inspired models. An example is the self-healing technique
used in the field of organic computing. In nature, self-healing is the automated pro-
cess of recovery of a natural being. In research, most likely bioinformatics, the aim
is to construct the self-X properties set depending on the goal. A self-detection ap-
proach could be designed as inspired by [37, 38].
Another potential approach is the Firefly Algorithm, inspired by the fireflies
behavior. A fireflys main behavior is flashing so it can attract other fireflies. The
concept is that the brighter the colour is, the greater the attractiveness is. Distance
also plays a role as it increases brightness. Firefly Algorithm could be potentially
used for feature selection and reduction as well as used as an optimization technique
for ANN/SVM/Fuzzy Logic techniques.
Besides detection, possible mitigation/prevention methods should be explored.
A good example for this process is the Cuckoo search optimization technique as
introduced in Section II. It is motivated by the cuckoo species that let their eggs on
hosts of other birds. If birds understand that their eggs are not their own they throw
them away or build a nest somewhere else. Eggs represent solutions and a cuckoo
egg consists of a new solution that can potentially replace the old one. The algorithm
can grow to a complex solution consisting a series of solutions. After detection, it
can be used to find an optimized solution. Also, Cuckoo technique could be used for
feature reduction and possible weight training of ALRFC.
1.7 Conclusion
As the technology rapidly progresses, it becomes a vital part of our lives with the
Smart City era approaching. Critical infrastructures and IoT networks become more
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complex in the Smart City context but still need to be continuously available. Hence,
the protection of infrastructures, such as the Smart Grid, against (D)DoS attacks is
important. Since an attack can become highly sophisticated the usage of natural sys-
tems to protect networks from intrusions could transform intrusion detection systems
into fast, accurate and robust systems able to effectively detect plethora of (D)DoS
attacks. Bio-inspired techniques are proved to be an efficient and practical solution
to various attacks.
In this chapter, we discussed the importance of bio-inspired techniques in the
field of intrusion detection. A brief explanation was given on the most popular cyber
attacks, as well as the most popular concepts of bio-inspired algorithm detection.
Furthermore, the most recent and high impact studies on this topic have been pre-
sented in a wide range of networks and a detailed discussion was made regarding
these studies. Concluding, future directions were highlighted for new research ex-
ploration in the bio-inspired era.
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